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VOLUNTARY PETITIONS AND THE CREDITORS' BARGAIN
Randal C. Picker*
One of the most notable features of United States bankruptcy law
is the relative ease with which a debtor can invoke the protection of
the bankruptcy court. Typically, the debtor need do no more than
pay the appropriate filing fee and sign the petition. The debtor
need not be insolvent, and in fact, there has been substantial doubt
on this issue in some of our best-known bankruptcies.' Nor must
the debtor make the substantive showing that creditors filing an in-
voluntary petition typically must make-that the debtor is not pay-
ing its debts as they become due2 or perhaps that the debtor cannot
pay its debts as they become due, given how readily manipulable a
"not paying" requirement would be for voluntary filings. This is
not to say that debtors file casually. The consequences of filing for
the debtor and its managers are often substantial and there is every
reason to believe that most filings are made only after much deliber-
ation. My point is only that once the debtor has concluded that fil-
ing is sensible, very little stands in the way.
Section 109 of the Bankruptcy Code defines who may be a debtor
and in doing so suggests the range of possible hurdles that a debtor
might be forced to overcome to file. A debtor seeking to file under
the (so far) little-used Chapter 9-the bankruptcy chapter for mu-
nicipalities-must show under § 109(c) that it is insolvent and that,
in most cases, it has either successfully negotiated a deal with credi-
tors, has negotiated with such creditors in good faith and has been
unable to reach a deal, or cannot negotiate with such creditors be-
cause such negotiation would be impracticable. 3 This is a fairly sub-
stantial showing: insolvency must be shown and prepetition
workout efforts are directly relevant.
* Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago: I thank the Lynde and
Harry Bradley Foundation for support and Michelle White for comments.
1. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 727, 730 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
Shareholders in the A.H. Robbins bankruptcy received stock worth hundreds of millions
of dollars. See In re A.H. Robbins Co., 88 B.R. 742, 751 (E.D. Va. 1988), aff'd, 880 F.2d
694 (4th Cir. 1989); see also DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H.JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS,
AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 183 (2nd ed. 1990).
2. 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(1) (1988). All subsequent statutory citations will be to the
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-151326 (1988), unless otherwise indicated.'
3. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(3), (5). Outside of the United States, insolvency is commonly
required. See generally Symposium, Circumstances in Which Proceedings of
Bankruptcy/Winding-up May be Initiated in Denmark, Germany, Italy, Norway and the United
States, 10 INT'L Bus. LAw. 31 (1982).
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There is a striking difference between the requirements for the
run-of-the-mill debtor and a municipality. Although the Bankruptcy
Code does confer on the judge the power to abstain or dismiss cases
when doing so would be in the best interest of creditors and the
debtor, 4 and while a broader requirement of good faith in filing
might be found in the Code,5 it is probably fair to say that §§ 109
and 301 of the Bankruptcy Code give the ordinary debtor a virtually
unlimited right to file a voluntary petition.
This is somewhat surprising given its consequences. We have a
rich nonbankruptcy insolvency law. (This is true, even if one ig-
nores, as I will, the entirely separate failure rules applicable to cer-
tain special firms, such as banks, S&Ls, and insurance companies.) 6
State law may, through statute or judicial creation, provide an as-
sortment of winding-up devices. Receiverships, assignments for the
benefit of creditors, compositions, and other similar devices are
available under state law to sort out the claims against the failing
firm. Other state laws are peculiarly relevant to insolvency, even if
they do not purport to address the full range of claims against the
firm. State fraudulent conveyance laws, such as the various enact-
ments of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act and the Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act, create rules that matter only when a firm
has failed. This is true also of alter ego doctrines-that is, rules that
treat the corporation and its owners as alter egos and thereby make
the owners liable for what would otherwise be corporate debts 7-
and their close cousins-and is also true of the occasional corporate
statute that makes shareholders liable for specified categories of the
firm's debts.8 These laws become relevant only when the firm fails.
Yet, filing for bankruptcy largely displaces state insolvency law. The
receiverships and the like that would otherwise apply do not. Indi-
vidual actions of creditors against the debtor under state fraudulent
4. 11 U.S.C. § 305.
5. See Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, The Implied Good Faith Filing
Requirement: Sentinel of an Evolving Bankruptcy Policy, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 919 (1991).
6. Entities for which other well-developed insolvency regimes exist have
traditionally been excluded from the federal bankruptcy law. See II U.S.C. § 109(b), (d).
For a historical discussion, see Michael I. Sovern, Section 4 of the Bankruptcy Act: The
Excluded Corporations, 42 MINN. L. REV. 171, 172-82 (1957). Whether an alternative
insolvency regime exists still plays an important role in determining whether unusual
entities will be permitted to file under the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., Cash Currency
Exch., Inc. v. Shine, 762 F.2d 542, 551-52 (7th Cir. 1985).
7. For a more extended development of these doctrines, see Mark L. Prager &
Jonathan A. Backman, Pursuing Alter-Ego Liability Against Non-Bankrupt Third Parties:
Structuring a Comprehensive Conceptual Framework, 35 ST. Louis U. L.J. 657 (1991).
8. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw. § 630 (McKinney 1986) (making ten largest
shareholders of closed corporations liable for salaries of certain employees).
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conveyance laws are stayed by the filing, the trustee can assert these
rights under § 544(b), and, in most cases, only the trustee can do
so.
9
Given all of this, a fundamental, but surprisingly, largely unex-
plored question is presented: Why should we allow voluntary peti-
tions?' 0 Assuming we should, how should we structure our legal
rules to induce filings by the right firms at the right times? In pursu-
ing these questions, I want to separate flesh-and-blood human be-
ings from entities that exist by the grace of the state. The topic of
the symposium-Contemporary Issues in Bankruptcy and Corpo-
rate Law-demands it, but this would be the natural dividing line
anyhow. The idea of the fresh start gives content to much of the
jurisprudence for individual debtors in bankruptcy.' This idea is
largely, if not completely, irrelevant for corporations and other busi-
ness entities: we can always get another corporate charter if we
need one, and we should therefore put no weight on rehabilitating
any particular one. (That idea should be understood to be separate
from preserving the going concern value of a business, if any. Pre-
serving a collection of assets is very different from preserving the
particular entity controlling those assets.) Given this basic differ-
ence between individuals and other entities, I will put to one side
the merits of allowing individuals to file voluntarily and will instead
consider this question for other entities. I will usually call these
"firms."
The idea that firms should not be allowed to file voluntary peti-
tions may sound odd, but of course it harkens to the early days of
bankruptcy in England and this country. The idea of voluntary
9. See, e.g., Flip Mortgage Corp. v. McElhone, 841 F.2d 531, 539 (4th Cir. 1988);
Palatine Nat'l Bank v. Strom (In re Strom), 97 B.R. 532, 539 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1989).
10. One recent article did confront these questions. See Douglas G. Baird, The
Initiation Problem in Bankruptcy, 11 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 223 (1991). For a historical
overview of voluntary petitions, see John C. McCoid, II, The Origins of Voluntary
Bankruptcy, 5 BANER. DEV. J. 361 (1988), and for criticisms of the circumstances under
which voluntary petitions are filed, see Frank R. Kennedy, Creative Bankruptcy? Use and
Abuse of the Bankruptcy Law-Reflection on Some Recent Cases, 71 IOWA L. REv. 199 (1985).
Somewhat surprisingly given the numbers, both the theory of and practical issues raised
by involuntary petitions have received more attention. See John C. McCoid, II, The
Occasion for Involuntary Bankruptcy, 61 AM. BANKR. L. J. 195 (1987); Lawrence Ponoroff,
Involuntary Bankruptcy and the Bona Fides of a Bona Fide Dispute, 65 IND. L.J. 315 (1990); Eric
J. Taube, Involuntary Bankruptcy: Who May be a Petitioning Creditor?, 21 Hous. L. REV. 339
(1984); J. Ronald Trost, Involuntary Bankruptcy: Pleading and Discovery Problems, 22 Bus.
LAW. 1207 (1967);James C. Van Horne, Optimal Initiation of Bankruptcy Proceedings by Debt
Holders, 31 J. FIN. 897 (1976).
11. For a discussion of these issues, see DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF
BANKRUPrcy 24-54 (1992); Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law,
98 HARV. L. REV. 1393 (1983).
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bankruptcy was not introduced in England until 1825.12 The first
federal bankruptcy statute in the United-States, the Bankruptcy Act
of 1800,13 allowed only involuntary bankruptcy, 14 and it was not un-
til 1910 that corporations could be brought before the bankruptcy
court, voluntarily or involuntarily.' 5 Thus, the notion that a firm
might be denied the right to file voluntarily, or perhaps to be denied
access to a federal proceeding in its entirety, is one worth
considering. 16
I want to shelve-at least temporarily-an expedient answer,
namely that if we-allow involuntary bankruptcy petitions we may as
well allow voluntary petitions, as we will be unable to separate one
from the other. A friendly creditor can be found-or paid-to put
the debtor in bankruptcy. This problem bedeviled the early bank-
ruptcy statutes,' 7 and there is little doubt that enforcing a bar to
voluntary bankruptcies will take some work. Given the difficulties of
policing the line between voluntary and involuntary bankruptcies, it
is worth examining whether there is any reason to keep firms from
filing voluntarily.
I will focus on the relationships among the creditors of a typical
business firm. I suggest that the stylized deal defined by the rele-
vant United States bankruptcy and debtor-creditor statutes has two
central characteristics. First, secured creditors are entitled to first
priority to the debtor's assets to the full extent of their security in-
terest (subject, of course, to no more than payment in full) prior to
any payment to unsecured creditors. Second, unsecured creditors
are entitled to any value in excess of that necessary to pay secured
creditors'again subject to no more than payment in full-and this
value is to be divided among the unsecured creditors on a pro rata
basis.
Unfortunately, this deal is not self-enforcing. In particular, a real
risk exists that the secured creditor might cheat on the deal and grab
the extra incremental value when it goes to enforce its security inter-
ests. As a group, the unsecured creditors face standard collective
action problems in enforcing their rights. Enforcing the deal with
12. See GARRARD GLENN, THE LAW GOVERNING LIQUIDATION 136 (1935).
13. Act of April 4, 1800, 2 Stat. 19.
14. Id. § 2. For discussion of the history behind this statue, see CHARLES WARREN,
BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 12-22 (Harvard Univ. Press 1935) (1972).
15. See generally GLENN, supra note 12, at 136-40.
16. As is the idea that we might want to allow corporations to elect in their charters
whether or not to be eligible for bankruptcy. See Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A
Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 1992) (manuscript at
36-46).
17. See WARREN, supra note 14, at 20.
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the secured creditor redounds to the benefit of all of the unsecured
creditors, but each unsecured creditor might seek to freeride on the
efforts of other unsecured creditors. These collective action
problems would be daunting alone, but they are compounded by
informational problems. Enforcing the deal between the secured
creditors and the unsecured creditors turns on knowing whether the
value of the assets subject to the security interest exceeds the size of
the loan. To put this in the economic jargon of the day, the un-
secured creditors face a state verification problem: they don't know
which state of the world has occurred.' 8 Consider a firm with a se-
cured debt of $100 and unsecured debts totaling $100. The assets
may be worth less than the amount of the secured debt, say, $80, or
they may be worth more, say, $150. In both cases, the firm would be
insolvent, but the unsecured creditors would be ignorant of the rele-
vant state. The unsecured creditors may be able to acquire that in-
formation, but that will be costly, and there is a substantial risk that
unsecured creditors will duplicate each other's efforts if they pro-
ceed separately.
The debtor may know this value. The debtor will often, though
not necessarily always, have better information than the creditors
about the value of the assets. Given the debtor's informational ad-
vantage and the possibility of duplicative information expenditures,
the creditors as a group would want to enlist the services of the
debtor in helping to enforce the bargains among the creditors. Un-
fortunately, unless payoffs to the debtor are specifically tied to pro-
viding the relevant information, there is good reason to think that
the debtor will be indifferent about doing so. In the situations rele-
vant to bankruptcy law, the debtor will be insolvent and will not care
about whether the deal between secured and unsecured creditors is
enforced.
We can make the debtor care, even when its equity interest has
ceased to be valuable. The debtor must be induced to provide the
critical information about the state of the firm (or, equivalently, be
allowed to sell the information in the marketplace). This could be
done through a penalty scheme, as occurs in the United Kingdom
and Germany' 9 or through a bonus scheme.20
18. The role of state verification problems in the choice of the capital structure was
first considered in Robert Townsend, Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly
State Verification, 21 J. ECON. THEORY 265 (1979). The current state of this literature is
usefully summarized in Milton Harris & Artur Raviv, Financial Contracting Theory, in
ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC THEORY (Jean-Jacques Laffont ed., 1992) (prepared for Sixth
World Congress (Aug. 22-28, 1990)).
19. See infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
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The United States has chosen the latter. The Bankruptcy Code
contains a powerful mechanism that should induce the debtor to en-
force the creditors' bargain. The debtor's right to file a voluntary
petition and to invoke the holdup power conferred on the debtor by
the automatic stay2' and the exclusivity period2 2 operates as a mech-
anism for compensating the debtor for filing a voluntary petition.
The right of the secured creditor under § 362(d) of the Bankruptcy
Code to seek to lift the stay can be used to sort out appropriate
cases that should and should not be in bankruptcy. 23 The petition
has the effect of resulting in better enforcement of the creditors'
bargain than would be possible in a world in which only involuntary
petitions were permitted.2 4
Although this view, if correct, seems worthwhile in explaining the
relatively unexplored question of the merits of voluntary filings, it
also helps provide a foundation for recent work exploring the effects
of the automatic stay. In theoretical work, recent developments in
bargaining theory have been used to explore formally the effect of
the automatic stay/exclusivity period on the division of the value of
the failed firm. 25 Unsurprisingly, this work suggests that the auto-
matic stay and the exclusivity period transfer value to shareholders.
And the recent empirical work on the absolute priority rule confirms
this. 26 The theoretical and empirical work has left relatively unex-
amined the merits of this transfer. This article suggests that the
20. Tom Jackson has noted the possible role of bonuses in filing. See THOMAS H.
JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 207-08 (1986).
21. 11 U.S.C. § 362.
22. 11 U.S.C. § 1121.
23. Though, in practice, the lift stay motion could do a much better job of doing-this.
See infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
24. Much of what I say is applicable to firms that have no secured debt, though I will
not focus on those situations. For those firms, the Bankruptcy Code should be designed
to enforce the pro rata bargain among the unsecured creditors. The state verification
problem that I focus on really exists only as between secured and unsecured creditors.
25. See Douglas G. Baird & Randal C. Picker, A Simple Noncooperative Bargaining Model
of Corporate Reorganizations, 20J. LEGAL STUD. 311 (1991); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Howard
Chang, Bargaining and the Distribution of Value in Corporate Reorganization, 8 J.L. ECON. &
ORGANIZATION 253 (1992); see also Yaacov Z. Bergman & Jeffrey L. Callen, Opportunistic
Underinvestment in Debt Renegotiation and Capital Structure, 29 J. FIN. ECON. 137 (1991).
26. See, e.g., Julian R. Francks & Walter N. Torous, An Empirical Investigation of U.S.
Firms in Reorganization, 44 J. FIN. 747 (1989); Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution:
Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of Claims, 27J. FIN. ECON. 285 (1990); Lynn M. LoPucki
& William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of
Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 176 (1990); Allan C. Eberhart et.
al., Security Pricing and Deviations from the Absolute Priority Rule in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 45J.
FIN. 1457 (1990). This work is summarized and extended in Michelle J. White,
Measuring Deviations from Absolute' Priority in Chapter 11 (April 10, 1992)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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transfer of value to the debtor effectuated by the stay provides an
appropriate inducement for the debtor to commence voluntary pro-
ceedings when it would otherwise not do so. 27
It may be worthwhile to comment on the methodology of this arti-
cle. The creditors' bargain approach to bankruptcy dates from Tom
Jackson's article Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Credi-
tors' Bargain.28 In many ways, this article applied the well-known
framework of John Rawls for exploring justice29 to the nitty-gritty
questions of debtor-creditor law. This has proved controversial.30
Some of that controversy may relate to an ambiguity about the
mission of the creditors' bargain approach. Two vantage points,
positive and normative, should be kept separate. The creditors' bar-
gain approach might be thought to be predictive: someone who un-
derstood the approach could predict the content of the Bankruptcy
Code. If so, that would save him or her the not insubstantial trouble
of actually reading the statute, and, more importantly, would sug-
gest that the statute was supported by a coherent intellectual frame-
work. The creditors' bargain model would then serve as a positive
description of the content of the bankruptcy laws.
As is generally conceded, making out the positive case is difficult.
There is nothing in the approach which would limit its domain to
United States bankruptcy law. Bankruptcy law across countries var-
ies enormously, and variety is a real problem for positive law and
economics. Homo economicus maximizes as well in the United States
as in Afghanistan. If one's business is predicting the content of the
law from economic first principles, one had better hope that the law
looks fairly similar across the board. At best, differences must be
27. Along with co-authors, I have suggested other reasons to think that this transfer
enhances overall social welfare. Lucian Arye Bebchuk and I argue that the violation of
absolute priority in bankruptcy improves ex-ante decisionmaking regarding investments
for a firm. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Randal C. Picker, Bankruptcy Rules, Managerial
Entrenchment and Firm-Specific Human Capital (Nov. 27, 1992) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with authors). Robert Gertner and I argue that the deviation from
absolute priority creates bargaining power in favor of the debtor and that this improves
out-of-bankruptcy decisionmaking about the failing firm's assets and the timing of the
bankruptcy petition. See Robert Gertner & Randal C. Picker, Bankruptcy and the
Allocation of Control (Nov. 27, 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
28. Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors'
Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982). For a reformulation of Jackson's view, see Thomas H.
Jackson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and
the Creditors' Bargain, 75 VA. L. REV. 155 (1989).
29. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
30. See David G. Carlson, Bankruptcy Theory and the Decline of the Creditors' Bargain, 61 U.
CIN. L. REV. 453 (1992); David G. Carlson, Philosophy in Bankruptcy, 85 MICH. L. REV.
1340 (1987) (reviewing THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY
LAW (1986)).
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described as two ways of achieving the best of all possible worlds, as
when the function f(x) may take on the same maximum value at two
different points x, and x2. Making even one country's bankruptcy
statute fit is hard work; getting them all in may be next to
impossible.
Alternatively, the creditors' bargain approach might be under-
stood as a normative lens. On that view, the bankruptcy law should,
but not necessarily will, reflect the actual bargain that would be
struck. Rather than predicting the content of any given country's
law, the content of the creditors' bargain would then suggest a
blueprint for reform of the bankruptcy laws. An economist would
term this an "ex ante optimal contracting approach" to bankruptcy,
and I will use this phrase to describe the normative part of the credi-
tors' bargain approach. This is quickly becoming an important ap-
proach to analyzing bankruptcy law. 3 ' That approach might suggest
that bankruptcy laws should set out as default rules the contract that
the parties themselves would negotiate.3 2 I will not address that is-
sue here, but will instead discuss what I see as the key elements of
the current legal regime and the role that voluntary petitions play as
part of that regime.
This paper is divided into four sections. Section I is purely de-
scriptive. It sets out in some detail the basic contours of the deal
between secured and unsecured creditors and among the unsecured
creditors group. Using the term "deal" is consistent with the opti-
mal contracting approach to bankruptcy theory but should not be
understood literally. Most of the deal is reflected in the applicable
statutory framework. Section II focuses on how the Bankruptcy
Code implements these deals, at least in part. It justifies voluntary
petitions by debtors and also explains why it is important to set
aside value for the debtor in bankruptcy. Section III offers criti-
cisms of the analysis and suggests alternatives and extensions. Sec-
tion IV concludes the paper.
31. I have used this approach in Bebchuk & Picker, supra note 27; Gertner & Picker,
supra note 27; Randal C. Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior, and Common Pools, 59 U. CHI.
L. REV. 645 (1992). It can also be found in Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy and Risk Allocation,
77 CORNELL L. REV. 439 (1.992); Rasmussen, supra note 16; Lucian A. Bebchuk, The
Effects of Chapter 11 and Debt Renegotiation on Ex Ante Corporate Decisions (August,
1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Alan Schwartz, Bankruptcy
Workouts and Debt Contracts (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); and
almost surely elsewhere.
32. Or it might not. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989) (arguing that
strategic concerns may suggest default rules designed to facilitate information
transmission).
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I. THE DEALS STRUCK
The respective rights of secured and unsecured creditors can be
understood only if three separate and sometimes complex bodies of
law are understood: state execution and collection laws; state laws
for voluntarily creating liens, meaning real estate mortgage laws and
the adopted version of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code;
and federal bankruptcy laws, as set forth primarily in title 11 of the
United States Code. 33 Together, these laws define the rules applica-
ble to debtors and creditors inside and outside of bankruptcy. It is
of critical importance to understand the rights applicable outside of
bankruptcy, those in bankruptcy, and what controls the choice of the
two regimes.
Start with the regime applicable outside of bankruptcy. These
laws are well-known for their intricacy, but for my purposes three
central elements stand out:
1. Special Contractual Collection Rights. Pursuant to a con-
tract, creditors may acquire special collection rights against
the debtor. These rights often entail the right to seize prop-
erty without judicial process 34 and, in the case of individuals,
may make property available to the creditor that it would
otherwise be barred from seizing.35
2. Special Contractual Priority Rights. Priority rights can be
created pursuant to contract. These define rights as among
equityholders-for example, the rights of preferred stock
against common stock; rights between equity and debt; and
rights among different types of debt. As to the latter, creditors
may acquire special priority rights against their fellow credi-
33. This discussion omits the Debt Collection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-365, 96
Stat. 1749 (1982), and other federal laws that might be relevant to debtor-creditor
issues. It also omits discussion of statutory liens under state law, such as landlord's liens
and mechanics' liens, and under federal law, such as tax liens, see, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 6321
(1988); environmental liens, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988); and pension liens, see, e.g.,
29 U.S.C. § 1368 (1988).
34. See U.C.C. § 9-503 (1992) ("Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on
default the right to take possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured
party may proceed without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the
peace or may proceed by action .... ").
35. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(c)(2), 522(f)(2) (1988) (enforcing all possessory liens,
purchase money liens and certain nonpossessory, nonpurchase money liens). The
applicable laws often impose substantial limits. These may go to the form for obtaining
rights against otherwise exempt property. Typically, such property is made available to
a creditor by granting a security interest and a simple waiver in favor of an unsecured
creditor is ineffective. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(e). Or, the limits may go to substance, as
§ 522 allows the debtor to avoid a broad category of nonpossessory, nonpurchase
money liens. Also, the taking of such a lien constitutes an unfair practice under 16
C.F.R. 444.2. See, e.g., Robert Scott, Rethinking the Regulation of Coercive Creditor Remedies,
89 COLUM. L. REV. 730, 747 (1989).
19921
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tors. These may be rights of one creditor as against a particu-
lar group of creditors, as would occur pursuant to a
subordination agreement. This would be an explicit deal
among creditors.3 6 In other cases, pursuant to a contract and
a public recording, an Article 9 security interest or a real es-
tate mortgage confers priority rights against all unsecured
creditors and against later secured creditors.3 7
3. Priority Through Involuntary Acts. Creditors who have not
obtained contractual collection rights or priority rights may
acquire priority over other similarly situated creditors through
involuntary acts taken with regard to a debtor's property.
Most often, this still requires delivery of an execution to the
sheriff or seizure of property,3 8 though a number of states now
allow creditors to achieve priority through notice filing.3 9
State execution and collection laws for unsecured creditors
typically confer priority as among the unsecured creditors
based upon the date of seizure. State seizure law is grab law,
first-come, first-served. 40 These largely unsecured creditors
stand on equal-footing: each can race to the assets to pursue
priority.
As already noted, a bankruptcy petition substantially alters the
way in which these out-of-bankruptcy rights are implemented. And,
given the ease with which debtors may file voluntary petitions and
their incentives to do so given the repeated deviations from absolute
priority, the deal among the secured creditors, the unsecured credi-
tors and the debtor must be understood in the light of how the
rights described above carry over into bankruptcy:
1. The Automatic Stay and Special Collection Rights. The spe-
cial collection rights of the secured creditor are largely illu-
sory. This would be true even without the automatic stay.
Under section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code, the se-
cured creditor can repossess without judicial process only if it
can do so without a breach of the peace. The latter phrase has
been interpreted quite narrowly, 4' sufficiently so that only the
36. And one that the law generally permits. See 11 U.S.C. § 5 10(a); U.C.C. § 9-316
(1992).
37. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-301, 9-312(5).
38. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L.& R. 5234(b) (Consol. 1978).
39. For a description of the new execution laws and a discussion of their
implications, see William J. Woodward, Jr., New Judgment Liens on Personal Property: Does
"Efficient" Mean "Better"?, 27 HARv. ON LEGIs. 1 (1990) (arguing that while new state
execution statutes will be more efficient, total system costs may be greater).
40. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 5234.
41. See, e.g., Stone Mach. Co. v. Kessler, 463 P.2d 651,655 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970);
Salisbury Livestock Co. v. Colorado Central Credit Union, 793 P.2d 470, 474-76 (Wyo.
1990).
[Vol. 61
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most aggressive secured creditor will rely on section 9-503
alone to take possession of property. Beyond this, bank-
ruptcy's automatic stay largely eliminates whatever remaining
force section 9-503 might have. Simply by filing, the debtor
can prevent the secured creditor from seizing property.
2. Deviations from Absolute Priority. As already noted, one of
the most consistent results in our limited empirical database
regarding bankruptcy is that out-of-bankruptcy priority is only
partially respected in bankruptcy. 42 Put more succinctly, abso-
lute priority is not: shareholders routinely receive value
notwithstanding the fact that creditors are not paid in full.
The creditors as a group are willing to pay off equityholders to
relinquish the control conferred on them by the automatic stay
and the exclusivity period. Most of these deviations appear to
come at the expense of unsecured, rather than secured,
creditors.
3. Preferences and Pro Rata Sharing. In bankruptcy, general
unsecured creditors share value pro rata.43 The ability of an
unsecured creditor to acquire priority through seizure of as-
sets prior to bankruptcy is substantially limited by the trustee's
right to recover preferences. 44 Although the defenses to a
preference are broad, only rarely, if ever, will seizure by an
unsecured creditor qualify under § 547(c).45 This recovery of
prepetition seizures protects the basic rule of pro rata distribu-
tions for unsecured creditors.
Note well how these basic elements interact. The rights of both
secured and unsecured creditors to seize property are severely cir-
cumscribed by built-in limitations under applicable state law, such
as section 9-503, and by the force of the automatic stay and prefer-
ence provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Outside of bankruptcy,
the unsecured creditors are on par with each other and this is di-
rectly carried over in bankruptcy under the pro rata distribution
rule. The essential characteristics of the creditors' bargain, if re-
flected in current law, thus emerge as priority for secured creditors
to the extent of their security and equality among unsecured credi-
42. See supra note 26.
43. 11 U.S.C. § 726(b).
44. 11 U.S.C. § 547.
45. See, e.g., Peterson v. Chas. Bender Co. (In re Lifchitz), 131 B.R. 827,835 (Bankr.
N.D. I1. 1991); In re Veteran Plate Glass Co., 71 B.R. 74 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987).
There are other rights that are important-rights as between creditors and third parties
and rights as among secured creditors, especially for creditors receiving purchase
money security interests, but I will not pursue them here. For one treatment, see Alan
Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 209 (1989) (treating choice of
order of distribution as optimal contracting problem).
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tors for the residual.46 The mostimportant way in which the Bank-
ruptcy Code's distributions deviate from the distributions provided
for outside of bankruptcy is the consistent transfer from unsecured
creditors to equityholders. Whether there is anything to be said for
that result is considered in the next section.
II. VOLUNTARY PETITIONS AS AN ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM
Consider the situation set out in the following figure:
Corporation A
Project Secured Creditor: $100
State Probability Value Unsecured Creditors
10 @ $10 = $100
S1 0.50 $300 _
82 0.25 $120 Total Debts $200
S3 0.25 $100
Expected Value = $205
This is obviously highly simplified, but should suffice to capture
the problem. Consider a corporation, ACorp, Inc. ACorp has a sin-
gle widget project and the project has three possible outcomes. In
the good state, S1, the project is a great success and is worth $300.
This is expected to happen 50% of the time. Of course, the project
may fail, too. In the first bad state, state S2, the project is worth
$120. This happens 25% of the time. Finally, :in the second failure
outcome, state S3, the project is a complete bust and is worth only
$100. Thishappens 25% of the time.
In addition to the single project, ACorp has a very simple debt
structure. It has a single secured creditor owed $100 with a per-
fected, prior security interest in the firm's sole asset, the widget pro-
ject. In addition, the firm has unsecured debts totaling $100
comprised of ten separate debts of $ 10. The firm therefore has total
debts of $200 matched with the project. For the given probabilities
and the associated values, the project's expected value is $205. 4 7
46. I have argued elsewhere that security interests play an important role in
allocating monitoring of the debtor and eliminating needless monitoring of creditors.
See Picker, supra note 31, at 650. There is every reason to think that security interests
would be part of an explicit bargain among the creditors. The same is true of unsecured
debt, though it is far from obvious that it would have all of the characteristics associated
with current unsecured debt. See id at 647 n.6.
47. (.50 X 300) + (.25 X 120) + (.25 X 100) = 150 + 30 + 25 = 205.
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Based on these figures, prior to running the project and determin-
ing the outcome, the firm is solvent.
Consider how this situation plays out in a world of perfect infor-
mation. If the project is a success-meaning that state Si occurs-
the creditors will be paid in full. The firm be worth enough to pay
the creditors and the creditors will know this. The equityholders of
the firm will then hold stock worth $100. If the project fails com-
pletely-meaning that state 83 occurs-the contractual priority of
the secured creditor would be enforced. The secured creditor
would simply get the full $100 in value, and none of the unsecured
creditors would receive anything. Again,. given the assumption of
perfect information, there is no difficulty reaching this outcome.
And, if the project fails but not completely-meaning S2 occurs-
the secured creditor would still receive payment in full, but each
unsecured creditor would get its pro rata portion-recall § 726(b)
of the Bankruptcy Code-of the remaining $20, or $2.
All of this is simple and straightforward. With full information
about the firm's value, the agreed upon division of value among the
equityholders, the unsecured creditors, and the secured creditors is
implemented as per the agreement. No one can deviate from the
prearranged split, as it is costless to enforce it.
Reality, though, is uncertainty. The creditors do not know, with-
out more, which state of the world has occurred, but in some situa-
tions, the debtor may convey some information about the status of
the project. If the project is a success, the. creditors will probably
get checks in the mail on time, and therefore a simple signal by the
debtor-payment in full, on time-makes it easy for the creditors to
distinguish state S I from states S2 and S3.48 But if one of states S2
or S3 occurs, no check may arrive. The debtor will be insolvent, and
without more, will have no stake in how its assets are divvied up
among its creditors. The debtor may pay particular creditors or it
may simply abandon ship. It will not necessarily send any signal that
will inform the creditors of the relevant state of the world.
The consequences of not knowing whether state S2 or S3 has oc-
curred are substantial. The most likely course is that the secured
creditor will take action against the project under its state law de-
48. Note that this simplifies and does so fairly dramatically. There is a well-
developed literature in capital theory which takes as its jumping off point that
borrowers, without more, will not even necessarily make payments even if they have the
funds to do so. Financial instruments then must be designed to induce the firm to make
voluntary payments when it can do so. See, e.g., Douglas Gale & Martin Hellwig,
Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem, 52 REV. EcON. STUD. 647
(1985).
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fault rights. The secured creditor knows that, regardless of whether
bad state S2 or S3 occurred, it is entitled to first crack at the assets.
In this situation, the concern should be that the secured creditor will
breach its agreement with the unsecured creditor group. It may do
that by selling the assets for $100 when they are actually worth
$120. Since the secured creditor must remit to the debtor any ex-
cess sale price,49 it may not exert any efforts to receive full value for
the sold property, if that value exceeds the amount of the debt.
The secured creditor also might behave opportunistically and
seek to pocket the excess value. The secured creditor might do this
by trying to retain the collateral in satisfaction of its debt.50 Notice
to the debtor may be required, but given the debtor's insolvency,
there may be little reason for the debtor to care about the retention.
There may be no other secured creditors entitled to notice of the
retention, and unsecured creditors are generally not entitled to no-
tice, 5' and may have no standing to object even if they were to get
wind of the retention. 52 The debtor may be indifferent to all of this.
These issues influence how the insolvent firm's assets are divided
among its many creditors, but these issues do not result in value
being made available to the debtor.
Alternatively, the secured creditor may purchase the property at a
sale conducted under UCC section 9-504 and resell it for a higher
price. 53 Attendance at public sales is notoriously spotty, 54 and noth-
ing in section 9-504's standard of commercial reasonableness re-
quires that the secured creditor receive the best price possible.55
The secured creditor may very well have private information about
49. U.C.C. § 9-504(2) (1992).
50. U.C.C. § 9-505(2) (1992).
51. See, e.g., Michel v.J's Foods, Inc., 661 P.2d 474, 477 (N.M. 1983).
52. See, e.g., Peerless Packing Co. v. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 376 S.E.2d 161, 165-66
(W. Va. 1988). One might contend that retaining collateral with a value in excess of the
debt amounts to a fraudulent conveyance. This would give rise to an independent basis
to challenge the transaction after the fact, even if the creditors lacked standing under
U.C.C. § 9-505 to challenge the retention itself. As a general matter, procedural
compliance with foreclosure statutes will not insulate a transfer from a fraudulent
conveyance act. Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 204 (5th Cir. 1980),
is the best-known case to so hold. There seems to be very little case law examining this
question regarding § 9-505 retentions, but that which exists casts doubt on whether they
would be found to be fraudulent. SeeJ's Foods, 661 P.2d at 476.
53. See Bank of Chapmanville v. Workman, 406 S.E.2d 58, 61 (W. Va. 1991).
54. It is easy to find reported cases in which only one or two possible buyers
appeared at the sale. See, e.g., In re Whatley, 126 B.R. 231, 234 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1991);
First Interstate Credit Alliance, Inc. v. Clark, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 1017, 1018
(Callaghan) (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Credit Alliance Corp. v. Concord Coal Corp., 81 B.R. 863,
864 (S.D. W. Va. 1988).
55. See also U.C.C. § 9-507 (1992) ("The fact that a better price could have been
obtained by a sale at a different time or in a different method from that selected by the
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the assets that will allow it to sell them for a higher price even after
it conducts a qualifying sale. 56 This in fact may be the preferred
route for the secured creditor, as unlike retention under section 9-
505, the secured creditor can pursue the debtor for a deficiency af-
ter a sale under section 9-504. 57 The possibility of retention under
section 9-505 or sale, purchase, and resale under section 9-504
places the original deal for dividing the assets between the secured
creditor and the unsecured creditors at risk.
Given all of this, to return to the example, the unsecured creditors
can have little assurance that they will receive, without some effort,
the $20 to which they are entitled if state S2 rather than S3 oc-
curred. How will the unsecured creditors respond to the uncer-
tainty over which bad state has occurred? As a group, they have as
much as $20 at stake, though the expected amount at stake is only
$10.58 If we assume (for now) that the unsecured creditors could
perfectly enforce their deal with the secured creditor once they had
learned the debtor's status, they would be willing to spend up to $10
to acquire that information.
The unsecured creditors, though, do not proceed as a group, and
the real question is how the individual unsecured creditors will pro-
ceed. To answer this question, focus on how the benefits and bur-
dens of the information acquisition-the monitoring, for short-will
be divided. It seems that both undermonitoring and overmonitor-
ing are possible. First consider rules that provide for each un-
secured creditor to bear its own costs of monitoring and that further
provide for the benefits of monitoring to be divided pro rata. For
secured party is not of itself sufficient to establish that the sale was not made in a
commercially reasonable manner.").
56. In In re Whatley, 126 B.R. at 231, the secured creditor purchased at the § 9-504
sale for $25,000, and resold it, at auction, the following day, for net proceeds of
$39,748.29.
57. See U.C.C. § 9-504(2) (1992). This route also may avoid the open question of
whether retention under § 9-505 can be a fraudulent conveyance. In response to the
perceived problem of Durrett, § 3(b) of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act provides
that "a person gives a reasonable equivalent value if the person acquires an interest of
the debtor in an asset pursuant to a regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclosure sale
or execution of a power of sale for the acquisition or disposition of the interest of the
debtor upon default under a mortgage, deed of trust or security agreement." As more
states switch from the UFCA to the UFTA, § 3(b) will offer greater protection for
complying § 9-504 sales. Note, though, that if such a sale falls within the one-year
window given in § 548(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, it will still be subject to avoidance as
a fraudulent conveyance, as § 548 lacks the foreclosure sale safe harbor. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 548(a).
58. They know the firm has failed-no check was received-and when the firm fails,
50% of the time, unsecured creditors are entitled to nothing and 50% of the time to
$20, giving an expected value of $10.
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example, if the cost of monitoring is $k and only one unsecured
creditor monitors and none of the others do, all of the non-monitor-
ing unsecured creditors receive $2, and the monitoring creditor nets
$2-k, if state S2 has occurred, and $0 and -$k respectively if state S I
has occurred.
Two points should be apparent. First, the creditor will not moni-
tor if the cost of monitoring exceeds its expected payoff from moni-
toring, or if k > $1. Second, each unsecured creditor would rather
free ride on the monitoring efforts of another creditor than monitor.
Under this regime, if the monitoring costs exceeded the individual
creditor's pro rata share of the recovery for each creditor, no credi-
tor would monitor and the secured creditor would be able to cap-
ture the value in excess of the amount owed to it. In our simple
example, that would occur if k > $1, since that is the expected pro
rata benefit from monitoring for each creditor.
Nevertheless, it is very unlikely that this would happen this way.
The benefits of monitoring for the unsecured creditors would be
divided pro rata only if the monitoring creditor chose to file an in-
voluntary bankruptcy petition. Pro rata division is the rule of
§ 726(b) of the Code and thus only applies after a proceeding has
been commenced. Pro rata division is not the rule that would other-
wise be applicable under state law. State law is grab law. The moni-
toring unsecured creditor will seek payment in full of its debt and
may even seek to split some of the excess remaining value with the
secured creditor. To return to the example, if the creditor monitors
and learns that there is $20 generally available for the unsecured
creditors, the creditor will demand $10 in payment in full. He may
also seek a share of the remaining $10 by threatening to inform one
(and only one) fellow unsecured creditor about the extra money.
Where does this put the unsecured creditors? Individual moni-
toring is relatively unattractive if the benefit of monitoring is divided
pro rata, but that will not happen unless the monitor files a petition
in bankruptcy. Since the monitor will not file, monitoring could be
profitable and more than one unsecured creditor could wind up
monitoring the secured creditor's behavior.
One solution to this might be to allow a special priority in bank-
ruptcy for the costs associated with monitoring whether a petition
should be filed, so long as the person seeking the priority actually
filed the petition. Nonetheless, this probably would be ineffective
because, in many cases, the unsecured creditor will conclude after
monitoring that there is no value for the unsecured creditors and
that no collective proceeding is appropriate. Unless the unsecured
creditor is empowered to assess its fellow unsecured creditors not
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only when value is there-as it would when it received a monitoring
expense priority in the bankruptcy-but when value is not there,
there will be undermonitoring of the secured creditor's behavior.
Both undermonitoring and overmonitoring seem possible. In any
event, the lowest cost monitor will not be monitoring: the debtor
would be the lowest cost monitor of the secured creditor's behavior.
As a general matter, the debtor may have the best information about
the value of the firm.59 Given the notice rules in UCC sections 9-
504 and 9-505, which fail to require notice to any unsecured credi-
tors, the debtor will surely have the best information about the se-
cured creditor's actions. Given this, the best possible result for the
creditors as a group would be to pay the debtor a fee to inform them
of whether S2 or S3 has taken place. Recall that that knowledge is
essential to enforcing the upfront deals of the creditors. The debtor
is the lowest cost monitor of this, but in the absence of a device for
channeling value to the debtor (or for penalizing the debtor), the
debtor will not care about seeing that the upfront deal is enforced
between the secured and the unsecured creditors.
The Bankruptcy Code does this through the debtor's right to file
a voluntary petition and through the automatic stay/exclusivity
rules. As already noted, §§ 109 and 301 of the Bankruptcy Code
give the debtor a virtually limitless right to file a voluntary petition.
The debtor's control over the property is created by the automatic
stay of § 362, which generally prevents creditors from seizing the
debtor's property. It is further enhanced by § 1121 of the Code,
which gives the debtor the exclusive right to file a reorganization
plan for 120 days, a period which is often extended.
The unsecured creditors want the debtor to file when the value of
the project exceeds the amount of the secured creditor's claim, or,
to put this in the language of the Bankruptcy Code, when the debtor
has equity in the property. 60 In a world where judges value prop-
erty and businesses accurately, the debtor will do just that. If there
is no value available for the unsecured creditors, the debtor will not
file. No value available means that the secured creditor's claim ex-
ceeds the value of the project, or to put it the other way, that the
debtor has no equity in the property. The secured creditor would
59. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control, Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247, 257 (1983); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C.
Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly
Held Companies 29 (December, 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
Compare Carliss Y. Baldwin & Sugato Bhattacharyya, Choosing the Method of Sale: A Clinical
Study of Conrail, 30J. FIN. ECON. 69, 86-87 (1991).
60. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2)(A).
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win its lift stay motion, and the debtor will lose its ability to holdup
the creditors for value. The debtor will not file. If there is value
available to the unsecured creditors-meaning there is an equity in
the property-the debtor will survive the secured creditor's lift stay
motion, and will therefore file as it will be able to exercise the
holdup powers conferred on it through the automatic stay and the
exclusivity rule.
This scheme sorts the cases precisely along the dividing line of
cases in which value in excess of the debt owed to the secured credi-
tor exists and those in which it does not. If there is no value for the
unsecured creditors, the debtor will not file, as it will lose the lift
stay motion and will therefore receive nothing through the exclusiv-
ity holdup. If there is value for the unsecured creditors, the debtor
will win the lift stay motion, and can therefore maintain the exclusiv-
ity period. The creditors will buy off the debtor, and therefore the
debtor will receive the value that will induce it to file in the first
place. This sorting is precisely what is required to enforce the split
agreed to between the secured creditor and the unsecured creditors.
This suggests that in many cases deviations from absolute priority
can be justified as a bonus for bringing the case in the first place.
The bonus is a contingent bonus, and thus avoids the overfiling
problem that would be associated with a flat fee or any other mecha-
nism not directly tied to the value of the assets. 6' On this view, the
automatic stay operates as a non-waivable means of channeling
value to the manager-shareholders that induces them to file volun-
tary petitions in those situations in which there is value to be distrib-
uted to the unsecured creditors. In effect, the unsecured creditors
appoint the manager-shareholders as their agent for enforcing the
original deal between the secured creditor and the group of un-
secured creditors. And the problems with verifying the state of the
world-are the assets worth $80 or $150?-that put the deal be-
tween the secured and unsecured creditors at risk are squarely
presented and answered by coupling the voluntary petition with the
lift stay motion.
61. Baird also cautioned against using flat fees to induce filings. See Baird, supra note
10, at 231. He suggested that managers will file to keep their jobs and that
compensation for filing will be paid in the form of salaries during operations in
bankruptcy. See id. at 230. That result is premised on the view that the managers are
being paid more inside the firm than they would be on the outside. That is an empirical
question, but the answer is not obvious. Compare Baird & Picker, supra note 25, at 320 n.
23, 334 n.50. Moreover, this is tempered by the fact that the mere fact of filing probably
has a signaling effect that reduces the value of the manager-shareholder's human capital.
See Robert I. Sutton & Anita L. Callahan, The Stigma of Bankruptcy: Spoiled Organizational
Image and its Management, 30 ACAD. MGMT. J. 405, 406-07 (1987).
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III. CRITICISMS AND COMMENTS
There are a number of open items. Consider these one-by-one.
First, a standard problem still exists: who monitors the monitor?
When the secured creditor seeks to levy on the property outside of
bankruptcy, the debtor could try to cut a deal with the secured cred-
itor and offer to keep the debtor out of bankruptcy in exchange for
part of the value the secured creditor obtains by breaching its agree-
ment with the unsecured creditors. There may be reasons to think
that this is less problematic here. Even if the debtor cuts a deal with
the secured creditor outside of bankruptcy, it will still be left with
outstanding unsecured creditors. The value received by the debtor
will not be insulated from their claims, and if the unsecured credi-
tors engage in some type of low-grade monitoring, such as engaging
a bill collector, they may be able to reach the value given to the
debtor by the secured creditor. A bankruptcy proceeding, on the
other hand, would almost surely allow the debtor to obtain value
that it can keep. The unsecured claims would either be discharged
or satisfied through the plan as part of the holdup deal with the
debtor. 62
Second, the analysis probably overstates the success of the cur-
rent Bankruptcy Code in sorting cases into bankruptcy. The debtor
will file anytime that it can withstand the lift stay motion as that is
sufficient to get the holdup bonus., Under § 362, the stay will be
maintained if the debtor can show that the creditor is adequately
protected 63 or if the debtor has no equity in the property and it is
not needed for an effective reorganization. As this does not focus
cleanly on the question of whether there is value for the unsecured
creditors, the debtor may file even when there is none. This risk is
exacerbated by the decision in United Savings Ass'n v. Timbers of In-
wood Forest Associates, Ltd., which held that maintaining the value of
the assets of the debtor during the proceeding may suffice as ade-
quate protection. 64 Timbers clearly undercuts the ability of the cur-
rent Bankruptcy Code to sort cases appropriately, as it causes too
many petitions to be filed.
Third, nothing said so far helps us quantify how large the devia-
tion needs to be or the precise mechanism for effectuating the trans-
fer. As to the latter, I have suggested that the current procedural
rights given to the debtor and largely exercised by management,
and in particular the automatic stay and the exclusivity period, allow
62. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141.
63. See 11 U.S.C. § 361; 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1).
64. 484 U.S. 365, 382 (1988).
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value to be diverted from unsecured creditors. Nonetheless, identi-
fying the mechanism for the transfer tells us nothing about the size
of the transfer required to induce the debtor to play its assigned
role. We care about differentials in and outside of bankruptcy for
distressed firms: for example, differences in job loss and timing for
managers or for the stigma the managers face going forward. As a
general matter, managers of distressed firms face a disproportionate
risk of job loss. 6 5 This holds true not only for their current jobs
with the filing firm but also for other employment opportunities,
such as outside directorships. 66 Beyond this, small-scale studies of
Chapter 1 1 suggest it stigmatizes those associated with the debtor.
This is true even of those employees who joined the firm after the
filing, who should have escaped blame for the firm's predicament. 67
By design, filing for bankruptcy is a very public act, and although we
may not be able to quantify the extra loss insiders of distressed firms
experience when the debtor files for bankruptcy, it is surely more
than de minimis.
Fourth, giving bonuses or "carrots" for filing is only one ap-
proach to altering the incentives that manager-shareholders would
have for filing. It clearly will work best where managers also hold
equity, and thus matters most for private corporations. This covers
a large part of the relevant landscape. Cases involving public corpo-
rations are exceedingly rare68 and, more generally, even large
cases-say, cases involving more than $100 million in assets-make
up less than two percent of the cases in which Chapter 1 1 plans are
confirmed. 69 Even this overstates the presence of large cases, as the
probability of confirmation appears to be positively correlated with
asset size. 70 Nonetheless, for public corporations, where managers
65. See James S. Ang & Jess H. Chua, Corporate Bankruptcy and Job Losses Among Top
Level Managers, 10 FIN. MGMT., Winter 1981, at 70; Stuart C. Gilson, Management Turnover
and Financial Distress, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 241 (1989) (stating that 52% of firms in financial
distress experience senior management change versus 19% of nondistressed
unprofitable firms); Kenneth B. Schwartz & Krishnagopal Menon, Executive Succession in
Failing Firms, 28 ACAD. MGMT. J. 680 (1985). Compare Stuart C. Gilson, Bankruptcy,
Boards, Banks and Blockholders: Evidence on Changes in Corporate Ownership and Control When
Firms Default, 27J. FIN. EcON. 355 (1990).
66. See Ang & Chua, supra note 65, at 72.
67. See Sutton & Callahan, supra note 61, at 406-07.
68. Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter 11, 101
YALE L.J. 1043, 1059-60 (1992), put the figure at well-under one percent both before
and after the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code.
69. Ed Flynn, Statistical Analysis of Chapter 11, Ernst & Young Study for
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 35 (October 1989) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author).
70. Id. at 34.
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hold only a small fraction of the equity, the deviation from priority
may be insufficient.
Fifth, and more generally, the analysis does no more than suggest
that a deviation from absolute priority might be useful. Putting it in
the Bankruptcy Code makes this a mandatory part of the relevant
legal regime. Creditors could negotiate directly with managers for
the services they provide and express contracts could be signed and
this may weaken the case for doing this through a deviation from
absolute priority. Or it may not. I have suggested that having the
managers file voluntarily addresses the collective action and infor-
mation problems that the creditors would otherwise face. They
would run into those problems at contracting time if the Bankruptcy
Code did not solve the problem for them. I regard it as an open
question as to whether those problems would suffice to justify such a
rule in bankruptcy.
Finally, we might try sticks instead of carrots; many countries do.
In Germany, directors of an insolvent joint stock company or limited
liability company have a duty to initiate insolvency proceedings.
Failure to comply may result in liability for damages, fines, or im-
prisonment. 71 In the United Kingdom, the Insolvency Act of 1986
added the concept of wrongful trading. 72 A director that knows or
should have known that the company could not avoid going into
liquidation and allowed it to continue to operate may be forced to
7 1. The laws applicable to the Gesellschaft mit beschraenkter Haftung (GmbH), the
primary business entity in Germany, include the following relating to the duties of
managing directors:
§ 64(1): If the company becomes insolvent, the managing directors
shall file a petition for the institution of bankruptcy proceedings or for
the institution of judicial composition proceedings without undue delay,
however, at the latest within three weeks from date on which the
insolvency has occurred. This shall apply accordingly if the assets of the
company no longer cover its liabilities. It will not be considered as
culpable delay of the petition if the managing directors pursue the
institution of the judicial composition proceedings with the diligence of
an orderly businessman.
§ 84(1): A prison term of up to three years or a fine shall be imposed
upon a person who:
1. as managing director contrary to § 64(1), or as liquidator contrary to
§ 71(2), fails to file a petition for the instituting of bankruptcy
proceedings or of judicial composition proceedings in the event of
insolvency or of overindebtedness.
2. If the person acts negligently, then the penalty shall be a prison term
of up to one year or a fine.
4 (Statutory Materials) BusINESs TRANSACTIONS IN GERMANY App. 6-34, App. 6-42
(Bernd Riuster, ed., 1991); see also Horst M. Johlke, Circumstances in which Proceedings of
Bankruptcy/Winding up may be Initiated in Germany, 10 INT'L Bus. LAw. 34, 35 (1982).
72. See Insolvency Act of 1986 § 214.
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contribute to the debtor's assets. 73 And, under the Company Direc-
tors Disqualification Act of 1986, such a director may also be dis-
qualified for a period of years from the management of other
companies.74
The choice between carrots and sticks should be guided by the ex
ante consequences of the different rules. Penalties that do not run
to the direct benefit of creditors, such as fines, imprisonment, or
disqualification going forward, may just dampen entrepreneurial ini-
tiative. Unless we think too many projects are started, we might be
better served by a bonus scheme that had the same effect on induc-
ing petition filings. Penalties that do run in favor of the creditors
may also be less efficient than bonuses if manager-shareholders are
systematically more risk averse than creditors. A bonus scheme acts
as insurance, while a penalty scheme exacerbates the substantial
losses already suffered by poorly diversified insiders. Monetary pen-
alties also may be meaningless if the manager is insolvent herself.
Another benefit of carrots is that managers seek carrots; they run
from sticks. Someone will have to play policeman-quite literally in
Germany-to enforce penalties and that adds an extra layer of costs.
IV. CONCLUSION
The two key elements of the implicit bargain between secured and
unsecured creditors are priority for secured creditors to the extent
of their debts and pro rata division of the balance among unsecured
creditors. Collective action and information problems put this deal
at risk.
Most typically, the secured creditor may cheat on the deal by
keeping the excess amount. The unsecured creditors will not know
whether the secured creditor's failure to turn over money reflects
the true state of the world-the unsecured creditors were entitled to
nothing-or cheating by the second creditor given the actual state
of the world.
The party best situated to know is the debtor. The debtor re-
ceives notice from the secured creditor of its intentions under the
relevant statutes and also has the most particular knowledge of the
property. With the firm insolvent, the debtor may pay too little at-
tention to the secured creditor. To make the debtor pay attention,
we must change its incentives. This can be done through penalties,
73. See Paul R. Ellington & Ian M. Fletcher, Responsibilities and Liabilities of Directors and
Officers of Insolvent Corporations in the UK, 16 INT'L Bus. LAW. 491, 492 (1988);Jonathan M.
Lewis &Jonathan E.F. Rushworth, Creditors'Rights and Risks by Financing During a Company
Crisis: The Law and Practice In England and Wales, 18 INT'L Bus. LAW. 62, 65 (1990).
74. See Ellington & Fletcher, supra note 73, at 494.
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though this has problems, or through bonuses. The current Bank-
ruptcy Code allows the debtor to select a bonus by filing for bank-
ruptcy. The procedural holdup the Code allows translates into an
ability to extract value from the creditors. This leads to the system-
atic deviations from absolute priority found in practice. These are
tempered by the right of the secured creditor to seek relief from the
stay. In a pristine system, the stay hearing would seek to determine
the relevant state of the world, to identify whether there was value
available for unsecured creditors. It is that question which must be
answered if we are to implement fully the implicit bargain struck
between secured and unsecured creditors.
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